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The author, who is the book review editor for Linacre Quarterly, is
a faculty member in the department of theology at the Catholic University of America.

In their efforts to care for the sick and the dying and to protect and
improve the health of the public, those engaged in the medical, nursing, and allied professions have traditionally been greatly concerned
with moral questions. Nurses and doctors certainly want to apply
professional expertise to the treatment of diseases and cases, but in
addition, they want to respond to the needs of their patient-persons.
They are, moreover, not mechanical robots but sensitive, conscientious, and responsible persons. As such, they want to do what is right
and good and not merely what is professionally competent and technically efficient.
The problem they - and all of us - face is to determine just what is
really right and good. There are times when this determination is
exceedingly difficult. An ethical or moral dilemma arises when there
are apparently good reasons for different and, at times, contradictory
courses of action, when one is perplexed about what one ought or
ought not to do. 1 The development of new medical technologies,
made possible by the marvelous achievements of contemporary biomedical science, has undoubtedly contributed to an increase in problematic or dilemmatic situations for health care personnel. Should this
newborn child, suffering from spina bifida, be treated immediately or
not? Ought we to continue intravenous feedings and the use of the
heart-lung machine for this aged comatose patient, or would it be
morally right to discontinue such treatment? Is it right to do an
amniocentesis to discover whether this fetus is afflicted with TaySachs disease and, if so, to abort it so that it will not suffer and its
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parents and others will not be burdened psychologically and economically with its care? The list could continue indefinitely.
The purpose of this paper is to offer some criteria or principles for
making good moral judgments and choices. On this matter there is, of
course, intense debate and over it there are serious disagreements.
Before presenting a normative ethical theory that in my judgment is
true and genuinely liberating, it may be helpful first to comment
briefly on the subject of freedom and objective truth in matters moral
and then to consider a type of normative theory quite popular in
contemporary American culture and to show why I consider it erroneous.
Freedom, Moral Objectivity, and Subjectivism
Precisely because it is, at times, so difficult to determine what one
ought or ought not to do and because sincere, reasonable people frequently disagree, and seriously, over judgments of right and wrong,
some conclude that it is impossible to determine whose judgments are
true or whose are false. 2 Some who reach this conclusion believe that
moral judgments are more similar to expressions of personal feelings
or emotions than they are to statements having an objective content
that can be known. Others who agree with this conclusion may not
believe that moral judgments are emotional utterances, but they nonetheless consider them to be devoid of objective truth. They rightly
regard morality as something entailing free personal decisions. After
all, no one likes someone else to impose his or her values on oneself,
and each of us experiences freedom in making moral decisions. At
times this freedom is a terrible and awesome reality, but it is a reality
nonetheless, and one that most of us value. They fear that if there is
an objective truth in moral judgments or norms, then freedom to
make one's own decisions is excluded.
People who take these positions on moral questions are subjectivists, because they deny that there are any objective moral norms that
can be truthfully known and affirm that ultimately moral jUdgments
must be analyzed in terms of freely chosen values or personal inclinations. Although I believe that subjectivism in morality is erroneous,
there is a truth to which those who hold these positions point and it
should be recognized even if subjectivism must be rejected.
There is no doubt that we are emotionally affected by moral issues
in ways that nonmoral issues do not affect us. Moral arguments are
frequently charged with emotion, even passion, and there is a reason
for this. In choosing what we are to do or not do we are determining
our lives and shaping ourselves, giving to ourselves a moral identity,
and in making these choices we are also, to a considerable extent,
letting others know what kind of persons we are and what kind of
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society we want to live in and hand over to our children. In making
moral judgments and choices we are, as it were, making or breaking
our lives, so that it is by no means remarkable that such judgments
and choices should engage us wholly and emotionally as well as intellectually.
Still this does not compel us to the conclusion that moral judgments are simply emotional utterances. We are capable of analyzing
our feelings and emotions intelligently and of asking ourselves whether
we ought to feel the way we do about the things we do and approve
others doing. Our emotional reactions do not determine whether the
actions we judge right are really so or not, and we ourselves frequently
acknowledge that our judgments have been colored or swayed by our
emotions. More importantly, we sometimes conclude that we are obligated to act in ways that we find emotionally distasteful and upsetting
and that we ought not to act in ways emotionally appealing to us. This
quite common human experience would be utterly inexplicable were
emotiveness the correct view of moral matters.
Those who fear that moral freedom and responsibility would be
destroyed were there to be objectively true moral norms, properly
stress the goodness and value of human freedom, but they actually
undermine a respect for human freedom by their insistence that all
moral norms and judgments are subjective. They value freedom, and in
my judgment, rightly so. But there are many who do not value freedom and who believe that it is perfectly permissible morally to impose
views on others. Here we have two contradictory moral positions. On
the subjectivist hypothesis, neither is really, objectively true. Those
who value freedom and the toleration of dissenting opinions might
seek to persuade others to accept these values, but they could point to
no objective norms, to claims transcending personal preference, to
support their view. 3
It has been suggested, and properly so in my judgment, that the
appeal to freedom to support a subjectivistic position in morality,
while well intentioned, rests upon a failure to distinguish carefully two
elements in moral decisions. A moral decision includes both a judgment of what one is to do and a choice to do what one judges one
ought to do. Decision as judgment has an objectivity as an expression
of moral truth that decision as choice cannot have. 4
In making moral judgments - and this is what normative ethics or
the attempt to provide criteria or principles for making morally good
decisions is all about - we are not simply expressing our own personal
preferences or private attitudes. We are affirming or denying that a
particular course of action is objectively good or bad, right or wrong,
and we stand ready to provide evidence and arguments to support
these judgments and to convince others of their truth. We can, of
course, be mistaken in our judgments, but we will be able to rectify
them if others can show us why they are erroneous. We would not be
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ready to change them simply on someone's assertion that they are
emotionally distasteful or incompatible with his or her set of values.
There would be no rational possibility of correcting our judgments, if
they are false, were there no objectively true criteria or principles or
norms in terms of which the errors in our judgments could be made
known to us. Our judgments, unlike our private emotions and personal preferences and even our free choices, are amenable to public
scrutiny and discussion. We can argue intelligently over them, and, as
Thomas Gilby has remarked, "civilization is formed by men locked in
argument."5 Subjectivism in morality actually erodes civilization, for
all it leads to is bitter quarrelling that is eventually settled by superior
might, legislative fiat, or judicial decree. 6
Decision as choice, as the expression of our own freedom to determine our own lives, lacks the objectivity that decision as judgment
possesses. We may not, as experience sadly testifies, always choose to
act in accord with our own best judgments about what we are to do.
We are free to violate our own conscience; we are free to sin. We can,
of course, come to repent wicked choices knowingly made, and a
better understanding of why those choices were wicked may be of
help, but only God's grace can effectively change our hearts and lead
us to amend our ways.
The position adopted here, that moral norms can be objectively
true, in no way entails intolerance for the liberty and views of others.
We can respect the freedom of choice of those with whom we disagree
in moral judgments. We may argue, and rightly so, that their judgments are mistaken, but we do not necessarily hold that they are the
result of either stupidity or viciousness. At times we may even, for the
sake of the good of personal liberty, judge that some forms of overt
behavior which we personally judge to be morally wrong, can and
perhaps ought to be tolerated by society. Nor are we necessarily intolerant and enemies of the good of personal liberty when we judge that
there are some sorts or kinds of behavior which simply cannot be
tolerated in a just society. A person, for example, who holds that no
one should ever be permitted to use children as subjects of hard core
pornographic plays and films is not necessarily an intolerant, insensitive, ruthless fanatic bent on imposing his will tyrannically on others.
Similarly, I would argue (although this is not the place to do so) that
the effort to extend the equal protection of law to those members of
the human species who are living, yet unborn, is by no means inimical
to the values of liberty and justice for alP
With these preliminary observations on freedom and moral objectivity in mind, I propose now to turn to the subject of normative
ethics. I shall first present and criticize a type of normative ethics
widely popular in our culture, then propose and defend a much different sort, one that is, in my opinion, true and therefore genuinely
liberating.
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Consequentialism
A type of normative ethics or moral methodology advocated by
many in America today is consequentialism. 8 There are many types of
consequentialism. Soine versions, in particular utilitarianism and the
situation ethics proposed by Joseph Fletcher, are purely consequential. They claim that all moral norms and values are grounded in
consequentialist considerations alone. 9 Other forms of consequentialism, including the "proportionate good" or "proportionate reason"
approach articulated by several prominent Roman Catholic moral
theologians,1O are variously called "mixed" or "mediating" consequentialistic approaches. 11 These versions hold that some, or even all
moral norms and values, can be established only if consequentialistic
considerations are fittingly supplemented by nonconsequentialistic
ones. 12
Despite differences, and at times these are very great, in different
forms of consequentialistic normative theories, all agree in claiming
that the proper way to arrive at a good moral judgment in problematic
or dilemmatic situations is to assess the consequences of the various
alternatives and then choose that alternative which promises to bring
about the greatest good, even if the "greatest good" in some cases is
simply the "lesser eviL" 13 As one advocate of consequentialism puts
it,
How do we discover the right thing to do? We discover it by balancing the
various "goods" and "bads" that are part of the situation and by trying to
achieve the greatest proportion of goods to bads. What constitutes right
action? It is that action which contains the proportionally greatest maxim·
ization of good and minimization of evil. 14

All versions of consequentialism likewise agree in holding that there
are no kinds of human behavior, describable in nonmoral terms, which
are always immoral. 15 A consequentialist would grant that "murder is
always wrong," because by definition murder means an "unjust
killing." But the consequentialist would then argue that in order to
determine whether the killing is unjust or not, one must discover
whether or not there is some achievable good that can justify it. Thus
the consequentialist would deny that it is always wrong deliberately
and intentionally to kill an innocent human being. It all depends on
whether choosing this alternative will serve to maximize good or
minimize evil.
We can see from this that in certain kinds of ethical dilemmas faced
by health-care personnel, for instance in cases concerning the abortion
of unborn children afflicted by genetic disorders, the treatment of
severely crippled newborns or the care to be given to terminally ill
patients, the consequentialist would seek to discover what action is
called for by evaluating the consequences and by trying to determine
whether lethal action or, at times, benign neglect might not be the
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morally proper course to follow. Different consequentialists would
reach different judgments in similar cases, however, because there
would be a disagreement among them concerning the determination of
the "greatest good~" Thus Joseph Fletcher would have no difficulties
in judging that an abortion is justifiable whenever the child might be
"unwanted," 16 and he would likewise judge, on a calculus of consequences, that it would be morally right to "allow" Down's syndrome
infan~ ffering from intestinal disorders to die or even actively to kill
the~There are other consequentialists, for instance H. Tristram
Engelhardt, who would substantively agree with these moral conclusions. 18 Other consequentialists, of course, would vigorously
repudiate judgments of this sort as erroneous and immoral. 19
What this shows us is that different consequentialists will come to
different normative rules and conclusions from their general principle
that we can resolve dilemmatic situations by assessing the various
alternative courses of action and then choose that one which will lead
to the greater good. This in itself is a purely descriptive and factual
consideration, but I believe that it is also a strong indication that any
kind of consequentialistic normative moral theory is beset with
insuperable difficulties and is thus erroneous and incapable of providing us with the criteria or principles we need if we are to cope
humanly and intelligently with ethical dilemmas in health care or in
any area of human life. 20
An obvious difficulty with consequentialism is the problem of identifying the "greater good." All consequentialists will agree, for
example, that we ought not to go about killing innocent human beings
for no reason. They argue that there must be some "greater good" or
"proportionate good" that such an act can serve for it to be morally
justifiable or that there must be some terrible evil that could be
averted by doing this sort of deed so that choosing to do it would be
the "lesser evil." Yet they find it very difficult to determine the
nature of the "greater good." Some, and Joseph Fletcher and act
utilitarians in general are illustrative of these, would attempt to discover this greater good by means of a quantitative calculus. According
to them, we discover the deed that will serve the greater good by
counting the number of persons who will be benefitted by the deed
and the number of those who will be harmed. If more people are
helped than harmed by the action in question, then it is the one that
will bring about the greater goOd. 21 The less simple and more complex varieties of consequentialist thinking repudiate this quantitative
calculus. In its stead they propose that certain kinds of human goods,
for instance personal dignity and integrity, liberty and the ability to
communicate, are "higher" or "greater" than such goods as physical
life, so that the choice to destroy physical life can be morally justifiable when doing so serves these higher goods of persons and communities. 22 Nonetheless, they have serious difficulties in "weighing"
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and "balancing" the various goods of persons and communities. Still
they are operating on the assumption that it is possible, at least
theoretically, to discover the "greater" or "proportionate" good, for
this is the basic assumption of consequentialist thought, one required
by its fundamental principle that we can resolve moral dilemmas by
weighing alternative courses of action, examining their consequences
and then choosing the alternative which promises the greatest
maximization of good and minimization of evil.
This fundamental assumption or presupposition of consequentialism is its basic weakness, one that has been noted by many writers,
most recently in important essays by Paul Ramsey23 and Germain G.
Grisez. 24 Each of us would obviously agree with the maxim that one
ought to choose the alternative that promises the greater good if by
good is understood what is morally good, for the morally good choice
is, after all, the one we are seeking to make in our endeavor to shape
our lives responsibly. The truth of this maxim, so understood, is what
makes consequentialism initially plausible to many people. But when
the consequentialist proposes this as the fundamental principle for
resolving moral dilemmas, he is not using the term good in a moral
sense. He is referring to good in the sense that it designates some
perfection or set of perfections contributing to the flourishing of
human persons and communities, to good in the sense that life and
health, liberty and justice, human dignity and friendship, knowledge
and peace, are "good." He assumes that we can weigh or measure
these goods, when a conflict arises, thus determining which among
them is greater so that pursuing it is justifiable even if its pursuit
requires us deliberately and of set purpose to destroy other goods. 25
The difficulty, of course, is that the basic goods of the human
person are not measurable quantities which can be compared and
balanced off against each other in any clearly unambiguous way. They
refer to a different dimension of our being and are simply not capable
of being quantified and measured. 26 How, for example, is it possible
to compare the good of knowledge pursued for its own sake with the
good of being treated justly, being in a state of good health or being
alive? The fact is that all of these are goods of human persons and
contribute to human flourishing. Human beings commit themselves to
the pursuit of these goods, and their doing so is intelligent and appropriate.
Health care personnel have committed themselves to the good of
human life and health, as lawyers and others have committed themselves to the good of justice, and as teachers and others have committed themselves to the good of knowledge. It would be arrogant for
a doctor to claim that the good of health is measurably superior to the
good of justice or knowledge, just as it would be for lawyers to claim
that in pursuing the good of justice they are pursuing a good measurably superior to the good of health that a doctor seeks to serve or the
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good of knowledge that others seek to pursue. Yet for consequentialism to be true, there must be some way to measure the goods which
go to make up the whole human good, to compare them in such a way
that one can clearly determine, in situations when various goods
appeal to us in different ways, which is the "better" or "higher." The
attempt to do so is doomed to failure, and this helps us understand
why consequentialists disagree so sharply among themselves in the
determination of the greater good. Because the goods of the human
person are in truth incomparable there is no clearly unambiguous way
to weigh and balance them off against each other. Thus consequentialists end up by arbitrarily asserting that one or another good is measurably greater than another.
Other objections can be raised against consequentialism as a method
for resolving ethical dilemmas in addition to the fact that it is predicated upon an attempt to measure the incommensurable and compare
the incomparable. 27 One which in my view is telling is the fact that
consequentialism is a form of extrinsicism. By this I mean that it
determines the rightness or wrongness of human acts by factors extrinsic to the acts themselves, namely by their consequences or effects. 28
The consequentialist, in other words, seeks to determine whether a
proposed course of human action is morally good or morally evil by
attempting to discover what that act will get done or achieve. But as
many authors point out, our acts not only get something done, they
also get something said. 29 They have something to tell us about ourselves and the kind of persons we are. They are, in other words,
intelligible, and we can discover their meaning and intelligibility. By
our willingness to do the deeds we do, we take on, as part of our
moral identity, the identity of doers of certain sorts of deeds. Thus if
we are willing to do what is in truth an act of killing a fellow human
being, we take on, as part of our identity, the identity of killers, even
if we seek to conceal this identity from ourselves. And, I submit, we
ought not to be willing to take on this identity, for in giving freely to
ourselves this kind of identity we are failing to become the beings that
we are meant to be. 3o The consequentialist, by identifying the moral
meaning of our acts with their results or consequences, is really engaging in a form of self-deception, for the consequentialist succumbs to
the temptation to redescribe the actions one chooses to do in terms of
their intended consequences, so that the very nature of the act is
ignored or kept hidden from the mind and from public scrutiny. 31
Thus the consequentialist will redescribe the act of starving a crippled
newborn to death as an act of beneficent euthanasia or of kindness, or
the act of using a mentally incompetent person as the subject of an
experiment of no possible benefit to that person as im act of scientific
research advancing human knowledge.
If a normative ethics or methodology predicated upon consequentialistic premises is erroneous, as I hope that I have shown, then what
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approach can be recommended? My desire now is to articulate a type ·
of normative ethics that can provide us with the principles we need in
order to cope with ethical dilemmas, whether in health care or in any
other area of human life, intelligently, responsibly, and morally.
A N onconsequentialist Theory of the Human Good
The position that I hope to articulate is rooted in the thought of
Thomas Aquinas and in the whole Judeo-Christian tradition and is
today developed by a number of writers, in particular by Germain
Grisez,32 John Finnis,33 and Paul Ramsey.34 This position agrees
with St. Paul that we ought not freely choose to do evil so that good
may come about (cf. Romans 3.8), and with Socrates it holds that we
ought rather to suffer injustice than to choose to do an injustice. It
rejects, therefore, the view, irremediably present in all forms of consequentialism, that the end justifies the means. 35
. This nonconsequentialist theory begins with the principle that good
is to be done and pursued and that evil is to be avoided. 36 This
principle is accepted as a truth needing no demonstration and incapable of being demonstrated, for its truth is evident once one understands what is meant by good and by evil. For good means what is
truly perfective of a being, what any being needs if that being is to be
what it is meant to be, and evil means the deprivation of good . This
principle, moreover, is the starting point or beginning for all intelligent
behavior. No matter what any of us does, whether it is morally right
or morally wrong, we do it because we believe we are achieving something good. No one chooses evil for the sake of evil. We may choose
what we know to be morally wicked or evil, but even in choices of this
sort we are seeking some good, and we attempt to justify our choices
both to ourselves and to others by appealing to some good that we
hope to achieve through the act we choose to do. 37
The human good, moreover, is pluriform. We have already seen this
in our consideration of consequentialism. There are many goods of the
human person, each contributing in its own way to the flourishing of
human existence and human communities. Among these are the goods
of life and health, truth, justice, peace, friendship, knowledge. 38 As
such, these goods are nonmoral, for after all a person is not a morally
wicked person because he or she lacks friends or is sick or is treated
unjustly or is ignorant. Still, these goods are real goods of human
persons and as such are worthy of human choice; we need these goods
if we are to be fully ourselves, and we have a right to participate in
these goods. 39
Moral considerations arise when we relate these goods to the human
will or, to speak biblically, to the human heart. The person whose
heart is open to God - the morally upright person - is the one who is
open to these real goods of human persons and to their realization,
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both in himself and in others. None of these goods is the highest good
(the summum bonum) or "absolute" good in the sense of being the
be-all and end-all of human existence, for only God is the highest good
or summum bonum. But a human person determines his or her moral
identity, his or her moral being, by his or her attitude toward these
real goods of human persons. Since these goods are truly goods of the
human person, we ought to be ready to acknowledge them as such.
They specify the sorts or kinds of good that we are to do and pursue,
and the evils depriving us and others of them are the evils that we are
to avoid in our actions. 4o Each of these goods (life and health, truth,
justice, peace, friendship, knowledge, etc.) is really worthy of human
choice because each is a good of persons, not a good for persons.
These goods, in other words, are what older theologians and philosophers called bona honesta or noble goods, because each is incomparably precious and priceless, because each is something intrinsically
perfective of our being and a created participation in the goodness of
the uncreated and supreme good, God Himself. None is a purely useful
good (a bonum utile), something good only for something else.
Since none of these basic human goods is the absolute, unlimited
good, the be-all and the end-all of our existence, none ought to be
regarded as such and made to function as the key to solving dilemmatic situations; none, in short, is the measurably "greater" or "greatest" good postulated by consequentialism for whose sake we are to be
willing deliberately and of set purpose to destroy other goods of the
human person, to close our hearts to their goodness. 41
Although we cannot pursue all of these goods all the time, they are
the goods that we are to do and to which we are to commit ourselves,
and the evils destructive of them are the evils that we are to avoid. We
may, in tragic circumstances, have to suffer their loss or destruction in
ourselves and in others when the effort to protect them would necessarily entail the choice to repudiate other real goods of human persons. We may also rightly choose to do an act that is itself targeted on
the protection of a basic good when this is being imperiled even if the
act will foreseeably lead to the loss of some other good when there are
no other alternatives for protecting the imperiled good and there are
no morally compelling reasons for us to refrain from acting. 42
Because each of these goods is really something good and hence
worthy of human choice and love, we ought to be unwilling to set our
wills, our hearts, our persons, against anyone of them and to say,
effectively through our actions, that anyone of them is, here and
now, not a good but an evil. This means that we ought to be unwilling
to choose, deliberately and of set purpose, acts in which we propose
to destroy any of these goods, to do evil so that good may come
about.
The nonconsequentialistic moral theory here proposed for your
consideration is, in brief, one that accepts completely the truth that
August, 1982

257

good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. It holds that
we are acting unreasonably ·13 when we choose to regard any real good
of human persons as something that here and now ought to be
destroyed of set purpose because its continued flourishing in a human
person inhibits participation in some other human good, a good that
we arbitrarily regard as a measurably greater good and for whose sake
we close our hearts and person to the claims of some other real good
of the human person.
I should like now to illustrate this nonconsequentialistic normative
theory by reflecting on some dilemmas in health care. According to
the principles grounded in a recognition of and love for the basic
goods of human persons (and of the persons in whom these goods are
realized) there are some sorts or kinds of deeds that we ought not to
be willing to do freely and deliberately. These are the sorts or kinds of
deeds in which of necessity we turn against or repudiate basic human
goods. Among these goods is the good of life itself.44 Thus, according
to the principles of this nonconsequentialistic ethics, we ought not to
be willing to choose to do deeds that can truthfully be described as
acts of killing human life. We ought not, therefore, choose to kill
unborn children because other persons do not want them or assert
that their lives will not be meaningful. We may take action to protect
the life of an unborn child's mother when her life is in danger of being
lost even if we foresee that in taking this action the life of her unborn
child will tragically be lost. In such instances our deed is not one of
killing life but of saving life that merits protection and can be protected only by the deed we choose. In choosing this deed, we are not
closing our hearts to the life of her unborn child, for the death of the
unborn child is not what we are intending to bring about, although we
realize that it will result as a nonintended and tragic concomitant of
the saving act that we have chosen to do.
On this nonconsequentialistic ethics, we ought not choose to kill
newborn children or dying patients either by benign neglect or by
taking lethal action against them; 45 if any alternative that we propose
to ourselves in deliberating about what we are to do in caring for these
fellow human beings includes the proposal to kill them because their
lives, in our estimation or in that of others, are of no value, then this is
an alternative that ought not to be chosen, for in choosing it we are
choosing death, not life - an evil, not a good. 46
This does not in any way mean that we may not rightly choose to
withhold or discontinue treatment for those patient-persons, or that
we may not rightly elect, for ourselves, not to consent to certain sorts
of treatments. We may, in other words, allow others to die their own
death and accept our own, and it can even be wicked to burden others
with "treatments" that serve only to prolong their dying and are of no
benefit to them.47 There is an enormous difference (one that many
consequentialists endeavor mightily to reject as meaning258
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less)48 between choosing to kill someone or oneself and choosing to
allow another to die or to accept death for oneself. 49 Moreover, we
need to recall that we can kill someone just as efficiently by omitting
to do what we are obliged to do as we can by taking affirmative
action. If your baby slips in the bathtub and is submerged in water
and you do nothing to help, you are killing your baby by your failure
to act just as effectively as you would by strangling it. Similarly the
mentally retarded newborn in need of an operation to correct an
intestinal blockage is killed and not merely allowed to die when
nothing is done and he is starved by "benign neglect."
I believe that these reflections may help us to gain an understanding
of what the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" care mean. They
do not refer to standard treatment; rather they are moral, not medical,
terms. Ordinary means obligatory care, and extraordinary means
elective or nonobligatory care. 50 I suggest that a crucial way for distinguishing between them is to ask whether failure to employ or continue a certain means is equivalent to a proposal to kill the person in
question. If it is, then the means is "ordinary" and morally obligatory;
if it is not, then the means is "extraordinary" and elective and nonobligatory .
These comments, I hope, may have served to give an understanding
of the vast differences between consequentialistic and nonconsequentialistic theories of normative ethics and their relevance to some basic
questions in health care. I know that many questions can and ought to
be raised about the nonconsequentialistic theory of human goods
proposed and commended here. Nonetheless, this theory is, in my
judgment, one that will enable us to confront ethical dilemmas rightly
and to become "locked in argument" should disagreements arise, with
the possibility of settling these disagreements by an appeal to normative principles of human choice and action that are universally true.
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Veatch, Rational Man (Bloomington , Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp.
17-46; Mortimer Adler, The Time of Our Lives (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1970), pp. 84-136; C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York:
Collier Books, 1962).
4. Cf. Germain G. Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Life and Death with
Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 341,342.
5. Gilby, Thomas, Between Community and Society (New York: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1953), p. 93.
6. Here it can be noted that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton (the 1973 abortion decisions) were an exercise in raw
judicial power. On this, see Grisez and Boyle, op. cit., pp. 238-242; see also
Robert A. Destro, "Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective
Amendment," California Law Review 63 (1975), pp. 1250-1992 and 1331-1341;
Joseph W. Dellapenna, "Nor Piety Nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion,"
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 6 (1974), pp. 389-409; Robert M. Byrn,
"An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion," Fordham Law Review
41 (1973), pp. 807-862.
7. The most extensive and compelling arguments to support this claim are
provided by Grisez and Boyle, op. cit.
8. Many authors refer to consequentialism as a teleological ethics (for this, cf.
William Frankena, Ethics, 2nd Ed. [Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973],
Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., pp. 20-33). This language is acceptable so long
as it is recognized that by teleological they mean a system which justifies moral
norms and judgments by assessing the consequences of human acts. However,
since these writers likewise distinguish teleological approaches from deontological
approaches on the grou nds that the former consider the concept of the good to be
prior to and more central in ethics than the concept of duty whereas the latter
stress the notion of duty (on this, cf., for instance, Beauchamp and Childress, op.
cit., pp. 20, 21), others - and I am in agreement with them - prefer to use the
term consequentialism to refer to those normative ethical systems that locate the
right-making or wrong-making features of human acts in their consequences (on
this cf. Grisez and Boyle, op. cit., p. 346 ff). The term teleological can also be
used to describe a normative ethics that is non-consequentialistic in nature but
nevertheless grounds moral norms in the notion of the good (on this cf. Grisez and
Boyle, op. cit., pp. 358-361, and Frederick S. Carney, "McCormick on Teleology," The Journal of Religious Ethics 6 (1978), pp. 81-107). Since this is
precisely the sort of normative ethical theory to be advocated later in this paper, I
believe that it is preferable to use the term consequentialism to describe the type
of normative ethical theory under consideraton in this section.
9. On this see Frankena, op. cit., (under his analysis of "teleological"
systems), pp. 14, 15; and Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., p . 33.
10. This form of consequentialism, which can be called the "ethics of the
proportionate good," has been developed by a number of Roman Catholic moralists in the past 15 years, including William Van der Marck, Cornelius Van der Poel,
Louis Janssens, Josef Fuchs, Bruno Schuller, and Richard McCormick. The pertinent literature here is extensive. McCormick has surveyed it both in his Ambiguity in Moral Choice (Milwaukee: Marquette University Theology Department,
1973), in his "Notes on Moral Theology" for Theological Studies 33 (1972), pp.
68-86; 36 (1975), pp. 85-100; 38 (1977), pp. 70-84; and 40 (1979), pp. 59-80;
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and in his essay, "A Commentary on the Commentaries," in Doing Evil to Achieve
Good, ed. by Richard A. McCormick and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), pp. 193-267. (This volume reprints Ambiguity in Moral Choice
as the first chapter.) These works should be consulted for bibliographical entries. I
have sought to criticize this development in several places. See, for instance, my
Becoming Human: An Invitation to Christian Ethics (Dayton: Pflaum, 1974),
chap. 4; "Modern Catholic Ethics: The New Situationism," Faith and Reason 4
(Fall, 1978), pp. 21-38; and "The Moral Meaning of Human Acts," Homiletic and
Pastoral Review 79.1 (Oct., 1978), pp. 10-21.
11. In his Ethics, Frankena uses the term "mixed deontologisms" (p. 43) to
designate normative ethical systems of this kind. McCormick uses the term "mediating approaches" to describe these systems, of which his own is a variant, in his
essay "Genetic Medicine: Notes on the Moral Literature," Theological Studies, .33
(Sept., 1972), p. 531. This "mixed" or "mediating" approach is the one followed
by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. What is
remarkable about their work is that one of the contributors professes to adopt a
rule-utilitarian approach (a purely consequentialistic one) whereas the other
professes to adopt a rule·deontological approach (one that grounds norms in
considerations other than consequences), but both agree that there are no sorts or
kinds of acts that are always wicked and that particular norms can be violated for
the attainment of the higher good. The reader is not informed which author is the
rule-utilitarian or which is the rule-deontologist (cf. p. 40). As do many "mixed"
consequentialists, Beauchamp and Childress hold that some moral norms are
"virtually" exception less, in the sense that it is hardly conceivable that some
"greater good" could justify violating them (e.g., a norm proscribing devastating
an entire city with its population), but the possibility of justifying an act
proscribed b y such a "virtually exceptionless" norm remains in principle.
12. To see this, it is only necessary to read carefully the descriptions of
"mediating" or "mixed" positions given by McCormick, "Genetic Medicine ... ,"
loco cit. and the literature therein cited, along with the proposals one finds in
Beauchamp and Childress.
13. On the "lesser evil" as equivalent in function in some instances to the
"greater good," see McCormick, Ambiguity in Moral Choice, op. cit., p. 76.
14. O'Connell, Timothy E., Principles for a Catholic Morality (New York:
Seabury, 1978), p. 153.
15. This point is brought out forcefully by McCormick in many places. See, for
instance, his "Notes on Moral Theology," Theological Studies 39 (1978), pp.
77·104. There he stresses that he and others who argue for a teleological-consequentialist grounding of all concrete moral norms understand a concrete moral
norm as one that can be expressed in nonmoral terms.
16. See Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1965), p. 39. There Fletcher proposes an absolute rule (something
unusual for an ethicist who denies that there are any absolutes!) to the effect that
"no unwanted child ought ever to be born."
17. For Fletcher a "Down's" child is a nonperson , as are others who fail to
meet his criteria for personhood. See his "The Right to Die," Atlantic Monthly,
221 (April, 1968), pp. 63,64, where he says that "a Down's is not a person," and
his "Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man," Hastings Center
Report, ~ (Nov., 1972), p. 1 and "Four Indicators of Humanhood - The Enquiry
Matures," Hastings Center Report,4 (Dec., 1974), p. 7.
18. Engelhardt, H. Tristram, ,Jr., "Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young
Children," in Beneficent Euthanasia, ed. by Marvin Kohl (Buffalo: Prometheus
Books, 1975), pp. 180-192. "Aiding the death of young children" is Engelhardt's
euphemism for killing them. Young children are, in his estimate, non-persons and
are "defined by their place in social roles" (p. 183).
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19. Thus James F. Gustafson would dissent from the judgment that it is
morally permissible to let a Down's baby suffering from an intestinal blockage to
die . See his "Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life," Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine 16 (1973), pp. 529-557 .
20. For an analysis of the difficulties consequentialists face in attempting to
cope with this problem see Dan Brock, "Recent Work in Utilitarianism," American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), pp. 241-269. See also Alan Donagan, The
Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 172-209.
21. For Fletcher's expression of this, see his Situation Ethics, pp. 95-99.
22. A dualism subordinating the body to the "person" and conceiving bodily
life as a merely instrumental good, valuable as a condition for higher goods of the
person, goods that need to be consciously experienced in order to exist, is evident
in the writings of many consequentialists. Thus Joseph Fletcher writes: "Physical
nature - the body and its members, our organs and their functions - of these
things are a part of 'wh at is over against us,' and if we live by the rules and
conditions set in physiology or any other it we are not thou . .. . Freedom,
knowledge, choice, responsibility - all these things of personal or moral stature
are in us , not ou t there. Physical nature is what is over against us, out there. It
represents the world of its." (Morals and Medicine [Boston: Beacon Press, 1960],
p. 211.) In an essay arguing for the moral right to kill oneself a nd others for
merciful reasons Daniel C. Maguire says: "Birth control was for a long time
impeded by the physicalistic ethic that left moral man at the mercy of his biology . ... Only gradually did technological man discover that he was morall y free
to intervene creatively and to achieve birth control by choice. The question now
arising is whether we may intervene creatively to achieve death by choice or
whether mortal man must in all cases await the good pleasure of biochemical and
organic factors and allow these to determine the time and manner of his demise."
("The Freedom to Die," in New Theology, No. 10, ed. by Martin E. Marty and
Dean Peerman [New York: Macmillan Co., 1973], p. 189. This essay originally
appeared in the Aug. 11, 1972 issu e of Commonweal.) Again, Richard A.
McCormick proposes that bodily "life is a value to be preserved only insofar as it
contains some potentiality for human relationships. When in human judgment this
potentiality is totally absent or would be, because of the condition of the individual, totally su bordinate to the mere effort for survival, that life can be said to have
achieved its potential" ("To Save or Let Die," Journal of the American Medical
Association, 229.2 [July 8, 1974], pp. 172-176; reprinted in America, July 13,
1974, pp. 6-10). While McCormick seeks to attribute some goodness to life as
such, it is difficult to say what th is value is , since he seems to make life a value or
good only as a condition for higher goods of the person. For the problems that
McCormick's position poses, see Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 171-181 and 220-227. For a critique of
the dualism of the consequentialists see Germain G. Grisez, "Dualism and the New
Morality," Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Rome and Naples, April 17-24,
1974), Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo Settimo Centenario, vol. 5 , L 'Agir Morale
(Naples: Edizioni Domenicarre Italiane, 1977).
23. Ramsey, Paul, "Incommensurability and Indeterminancy in Moral Choice,"
in Doing Evil to Achieve Good, op. cit., pp. 69-144.
24. Grisez , Germain G., "Against Consequentialism," American Journal of
Jurisprudence , 23 (1978) .
25. McCormick lucidly articulates this cardinal principal of the consequentialists. Thus he writes that "where a higher good is at stake and the only means to
protect it is to choose to do a non-moral evil [i.e., destroy some true basic good of
the human person, such as life and health 1 then the will remains properly disposed to the values constitutive of human good" (Ambiguity in Moral Choice, pp.
78, 79; cf. his "Notes on Moral Theology," Theological Studies 33 [1972], pp.
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74, 75. In his more recent "A Commentary on the Commentaries," McCormick
now admits that it is not possible stric tly to "measure" the various human goods.
Still he claims that the goods are "associated" in such a way that we can determine whether or not a "greater good" would be served only by the necessary but
still deliberate and directly inte nded destruction of an associated good . He contends that when we directly intend evil in this way, we are m erely tolerating or
accepting the evil, not consenting to it or endorsing it. To make this claim is to
abolish, in my judgment, the significance of the difference between an intending
will and a merely permissive will, a distinction that McCormick e lsewh ere accepts .
26. This is brought out quite well by Ramsey and Grisez in the works cited in
notes 23 and 24.
27. A very substantive objection is developed by Germain Grisez in his article
"Against Consequentialism," (cf. note 24) and in the work h e co-authored with
Joseph Boyle, Life and Death With Liberty and Justice, pp. 346-354. It shows
that the commensurability of human goods demanded by consequentialism renders freedom of choice illusory.
28. For the distinction between acts and consequences see the brilliant discussion provided by Eric D'Arcy in his book, Human Acts: An Essay in Their Moral
Evaluation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 1-40.
29. This is beautifully brought out by Herbert McCabe in his work What Is
Ethics All About? (published in England under the title, Love, Law, and Language) (Washington, D.C.: Corpus, 1969), pp. 90-94 . See also my Becoming
Human, op. cit., pp. 79-84.
30. I have sought to d evelop this idea in "Ethics and Human Id entity: The
Challenge of the New Biology ," Horizons: Journal of the College Theology
Society,3 (1976), pp. 17-36.
3l. This is brilliantly brought out by D'Arcy, op. cit., pp. 1-40 and by Paul
Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1967), pp. 193-226.
32. Grisez has developed his theory in several places. The most important are
the following: Contraception and Natural Law (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co .,
1964), chap. 3; "The First Principle of Natural Law: A Commentary on Summa
Theologiae, 1-2, Q. 94, A. 2," Natura l Law Forum, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201 ;
Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments (New York: Corpus,
1970), chap. 6; "Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing," American
Journal of Jurisprudence (= the new title of Natural Law Forum), 15 (1970) , pp.
64-96; "Against Consequentialism," loc. cit.; and in the work h e recently
co-authored with Joseph M. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice, pp.
358-442.
33. Finnis, John , Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1980).
34. Ramsey has developed his thought in many places. See in particular his War
and the Christian Conscience (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961) ; Deeds
and Rules in Christian Ethics; "The Case of the Curious Exception," in Norm and
Context in Christian Ethics," e d. by Gene Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York:
Charl es Scribner's Sons, 1968); "Incommensurability and Indeterminancy in
Moral Choice," loc. cit.
This position is also developed by such writers as Peter T. Geach and Elizabeth
Anscombe . See Geach's The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977); God and the Soul (New York: Schocken Books, 1969); Anscombe's Intention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
35. Thus McCormick writes that " it is legitimate to intend premoral evil [e.g. ,
the dea th of a human person) in ordine ad finem proportionatum ." See "Notes on
Moral Theology," Theological Studies 33 (1972), pp. 74,75. Thus, too , O'Connell
writes that the "maxim," "the end does not justify the means, " must be rejected
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if by "end" we mean ·"consequences," for it is the consequences and the consequences alone, that justify the means, op. cit., p . 172.
36. This is precisely the way that St. Thomas formulates the very first principle
or precept of practical reason in Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 94, 2. On the significance of this, see the essay on this Thomistic text by Grisez, cited in note 32. See
also my "The Nature and Meaning of Natural Law in St. Thomas," American
Journal of Jurisprudence, 22 (1977).
37. Here it is instructive to note how the work of contemporary psychologists,
such as Lawrence Kohlberg, helps to verify the judgment that we always act for
some good and seek to justify our actions in terms of the good that we intend to
achieve as a consequence of our actions. For a discussion of this, see my "Natural
Law, Conscience, and Developmental Psychology," Communio, 3 (1975), pp.
3-31. See also the second part of Mortimer Adler's The Time of Our Lives, op. cit.
38. Grisez (cf. the works cited in note 32) believes that the basic human goods
can be analytically reduced to eight in number. 1 am not necessarily in agreement
with him on this matter. The point is that such goods as life and health and the
others noted are definitely goods that we seek for their own sake an d not merely
for the sake of something else. On the intrinsic goodness of life itself, see the
discussion by Grisez and Boyle, op cit., pp. 372-380.
39. On real goods as the basis for true human rights, see Jacques Maritain, Man
and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1958) and Adler, op. cit.
40. Thus in Summa Theologiae, 1·2, 94, 2, after showing why the first principle of practical reason is that good is to be done and pursued a nd that evil is to
be avoided, St. Thomas goes on to note that there are many "first" principles
insofar as there are many basic goods of the human person corresponding to
natural inclinations or tendencies pertaining to the human person by virtue of the
person's being a substantive reality, a living, bodily being, and 'an intelligent being.
These other "first" principles of practical reason or of "natural law" are not
derived in any kind of deductive, rationalistic way but are rather specifications of
the good to which we are directed by this precept and of the evils that we are to
avoid. For more detailed comments and justifications of this, see Grisez's essay on
this text cited in note 32, my own essay cited in note 36, and R. A. Armstrong's
excellent study, Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).
41. Basically, the consequentialists arbitrarily select one or another of the
human goods and erect it into an "exception-making" criterion that will enable
them to justify (I would say "rationalize") their choice to do evil for the sake of a
greater good. On an exception-making criterion and the mischief it creates, see
David Lyons, The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 125 ff and Paul Ramsey, "The Case of the Curious Exception,"
op. cit., pp. 82-93. On p. 86, Ramsey states: "The fact is that if one attaches an
exception-making criterion at any point along a line of reasoning from the more
general to the more specific moral principles, all the moral insight that went
before the scale is immediately suspended."
42. Here 1 am paraphrasing the essential conditions for the principle of double
effect. For an understanding of this key principle, one that Ramsey says (in his
War and Christian Conscience) is rooted in Christian love, see the following:
Joseph T. Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect,"
Theological Studies, 10 (1949), pp. 40-61; J. Ghoos, "L'Acte a double effet:
Etude de Theologie Positive," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 27 (1951), pp.
30-52; Grisez, in Abortion, pp. 273-346, in "Toward a Consistent Natural Law
Ethics of Killing," loco cit., and in the Grisez and Boyle book cited already, pp.
404-407; and my essay, "Double Effect, Principle of," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. by Warren T. Reich (New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1978). The
principle is rooted in St. Thomas's thought as developed in Summa Theologiae,
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2-2,64,7, and it focuses on the centrality of intention in moral choice.
43. To act unreasonably is different from acting irrationally. The sinner is
unreasonable; he is not irrational.
44. It has already been noted (cf. note 22) that many consequentialists manifest a dualistic concept of man, whereby they regard physical life as something
subhuman and subpersonal. Were they right, then life itself would not be a basic
good of the human person. But dualism as an account of the human reality is not
acceptable.
45. A brilliant summary and devastating critique of those who seek to judge
the "meaningfulness" of the lives of crippled newborns and to help them die by
benign neglect is provided by Paul Ramsey in his Ethics at the Edges of Life, pp.
189-267. One must read these pages to understand properly what is going on
today and why it is imperative to act to prevent the continuation of practices now
widely accepted.
46. Writers like Maguire (cf. note 22) speak of death as a "friend" and a
"good." Incisive criticism of this sort of language is provided by Ramsey in his
"The Indignity of 'Death with Dignity,' " in Death, Dying, and Euthanasia, ed. by
David Horan and David Mall (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of
America, 1977), pp. 306-313.
47. For the validity of the distinction between killing and allowing to die, see
Ramsey, Patient as Person (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), chap. 6;
Arthur Dyck, "An Alternative to an Ethics of Euthanasia," in To Live or To Die,
ed. by Robert Williams (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1973); Grisez and Boyle, op.
cit., pp. 414 -42 2.
48. Thus Fletcher, in "An Ethics of Euthanasia," in Williams, op. cit., argues
that there is no difference between killing someone and letting someone die
because the result is the same, a corpse. Of course, Fletcher fails to note that it
can at times be obligatory to prevent a person's death. Another essay disparaging
(and caricaturing) this distinction is James Rachels'S, "Active and Passive Euthanasia," New England Journal of Medicine, 292 (1975), pp. 78-80.
49. In addition to the works cited in note 47, see my Human Existence, Medicine and Ethics: Reflections on Human Life (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1977), pp. 145-147.
50. This distinction is made by many writers, e.g., Ramsey, in Patient as Person, Dyck, in art. cit. In his recent Ethics at the Edges of Life, Ramsey seeks to
substitu te the terminology "medically indicated" and "medically nonindicated"
for "ordinary" and "extraordinary." His purpose is "to provide terminology that
will direct attention to objective features and away from subjective judgments
predicated on someone's concept of "meaningful life." See Ethics at the Edges of
Life, pp. 153-159, and 235-245, and elsewhere (cf. index , under "medical indications policy").
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